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RICO

Fillingin the Gap Left by Congress: What is the
Statute of Limitationsfor PrivateRICO Claims?
by Barbara Black

Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc.
V.

Crown Life Insurance Co.
(Docket Nos. 86-497 and 86-531)
Argued April 21, 1987
In increasing number,, victims of business fraud are
bringing lawsuits under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Since the statute
does not set out a time limit for bringing suit, the courts
must determine the appropriate statute of limitations.
Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc. v. Crown Life Insurance Co.
illustrates the difficulties Congress creates for the courts
when it fails to provide a limitations period.
RICO makes it illegal to engage in a "pattern of
racketeering activity" for certain illegal purposes. A
"pattern of racketeering activity" consists of at least two
acts of "racketeering activity" within a ten-year period.
"Racketeering activity" is defined in terms of a number
of state and federal offenses, commonly referred to as
predicate offenses. In addition to criminal penalties,
RICO provides that any person injured in business or
property by reason of a RICO violation may recover
treble damages and attorneys' fees.
ISSUE
In this case, the Supreme Court will determine the
statute of limitations for a RICO treble damages claim.
To answer this question, the Court must decide a number of related issues: Should the courts borrow a statute
of limitations from state or federal law? Should there be
a uniform statute of limitations for all RICO claims, or
should the limitations period vary from case to case,
depending upon the underlying offenses? If there
should be a uniform period, what is the most appropriate characterization for a private RICO claim?
FACTS
Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc. had been an agent of
Crown Life Insurance Company in the Pittsburgh area
until Crown Life terminated the agency in February,
BarbaraBlack is a Visiting Associate Professorof Law at New
York Law School, 57 Worth Street, New York, NY 10031;
telephone (212) 431-2340.

1978. Crown Life said the agency was terminated because Malley-Duff failed to meet a production quota.
Malley-Duff claimed that the quota was "bogus," and
that the termination was part of a plan to eliminate
various successful Crown Life agencies across the country.
In April, 1978, Malley-Duff filed suit against Crown
Life and others, alleging violations of the antitrust laws
and conspiracy to tortiously interfere with their contract. In the early stages of this case, defendants allegedly committed perjury, destroyed relevant documents,
intimidated a witness and attempted to blackmail the
judge originally assigned to the case.
In March, 1981, Malley-Duff brought the present
suit against Crown Life and others, alleging violations of
RICO based on the 1978 termination of the agency and
the alleged misconduct in the earlier case.
The district court dismissed Malley-Duff's RICO
claims based on the 1978 termination, on the ground
that they were barred by the statute of limitations. The
district court turned to the law of Pennsylvania (where
the court was located) to "borrow" the limitations period
of the cause of action most closely analogous to MalleyDuff's RICO claim. The district court held that common
law fraud was the most closely analogous state cause of
action and applied a two-year limitations period. Claims
relating to events that occurred in early 1978 were
therefore time-barred.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed (792 F.
2d 341 (1986)). The circuit court held that within each
state, all RICO claims, regardless of the specific factual
allegations, should be subject to a uniform period of
limitations and that in Pennsylvania, that period is the
six-year residual "catchall" statute of limitations for actions that are not governed by any more specific time
period.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
While RICO was originally enacted to stein the infiltration and corruption of leg;' mate businesses by organized crime, attorneys representing the victims of
business and commercial fraud now routinely add a
claim alleging a RICO violation. The principal attraction
of RICO is that the successful plaintiff can recover treble
damages and attorneys' fees. In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. hnrex
Co. (473 U.S. 479 (1985); Preview, 1984-85 term, pp.
411-13), the Supreme Court rejected restrictive interPREVIEW
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pretations of civil RICO and held that it was indeed a
federal business fraud statute. Thus, unless Congress
determines to restrict use of RICO by private plaintiffs,
federal courts will continue to hear an increasing number of private RICO suits.
Because Congress did not provide a limitations period for the private RICO treble damages claim, the
courts must borrow a statute of limitations from another
law. There are four possible approaches: 1) a uniform
limitations period for all RICO claims within a state,
borrowed from state law, based on a general characterization of the RICO claim; 2) a limitations period, borrowed from state law, which varies from case to case,
depending upon the underlying offenses alleged in the
particular case; 3) a uniform limitations period for all
RICO claims, borrowed from federal law, or 4) a limitations period, borrowed from federal law, in those cases
where the predicate offenses are federal offenses.
Generally, where Congress has not provided a limitations period for a federal cause of action, the courts look
to the law of the state in which the court is located and
borrow the statute of limitations of the most closely
analogous cause of action. Thus, in Wilson v. Garcia (471
U.S. 261 (1985); Preview, 1984-85 term, pp. 406-8), the
Court assumed that the statute of limitations for a claim
arising under the civil rights statute (section 1983)
should be borrowed from state law. The issue in that
case was how to characterize the cause of action for the
phirpose of determining what state statute of limitations
to borrow. The Court held that the characterization of a
section 1983 claim was a question of federal law. It also
held that a simple, broad characterization of all section
1983 claims best served the statute's remedial purposes,
rather than an approach based on an analysis of the
particular facts of each claim, which would engender
uncertainty and time-consuming litigation. Finally, the
Court held that section 1983 claims should be characterized as personal injury actions.
The Third Circuit, in Malley-Duff, interpreted Wilson
v. Garcia as marking out a general approach to all statute
of limitations borrowing principles and followed its
three-part inquiry. It first determined that federal law
should control the characterization of the RICO claim.
Second, the circuit court held that all RICO claims
should be characterized in the same way, and that characterization should not vary according to the facts and
circumstances of a particular case. Finally, the court had
to select the most appropriate state statute of limitations.
In doing this, the court rejected the limitations periods
for common law fraud (either two or six years in Pennsylvania) and the limitations period for civil penalty or
forfeiture (two years), and selected the six-year residual
"catchall" statute of limitations for actions, primarily
based on statute, that are not governed by any more
specific period of limitations. It noted, however, that in
states which have adopted their own RICO statutes with

private causes of action, the state limitations period controlling such actions might be an appropriate choice for
the federal courts to borrow.
On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished Wilson v. Garciain Silherbergv. Thomson McKinnon Securities (787 F. 2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1986)).
There, the court applied the state statute of limitations
applicable to the specific predicate offenses alleged in
plaintiff's complaint. This then involves determining the
applicable period on a case-by-case analysis.
The third approach is based on DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters (462 U.S. 151 (1983)),
where the Supreme Court held that federal courts
should borrow a limitation period from another federal
statute "when a rule from elsewhere in federal law
clearly provides a closer analogy than available state
statutes and when the federal policies at stake and the
practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly
more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking." In
Malley-Duff, the Third Circuit addressed the possibility
of borrowing the four-year limitations period for private
treble damages antitrust suits, but rejected this approach. Judge Sloviter's concurring opinion in MalleyDuff and in a companion case, A.J. Cunningham.Packing
Corp. v. Congress Financial Corp. (792 F. 2d 330 (3d Cir.
1986)), argues that this isthe proper approach.
Finally, the fourth approach is illustrated in Bartels v.
Clayton Brokerage Co. of St. Louis (631 F. Supp. 442
(S.D.N.Y. 1986)), where the court borrowed the statute
of limitations from the Commodities Exchange Act, because the predicate offenses arose from that federal
statute.
The confusion over the appropriate statute of limitations was inevitable, given congressional failure to provide one and the complexities of the RICO statute.
Litigation over a collateral issue like the statute of limitations is unfortunate, especially since there are many
difficult and unresolved questions of substantive law
involving the interpretation of the RICO provisions. It is
important that there be either a specific time limitation
or an accepted approach for determining the time period. Malley-DuffAssociates & Co., Inc. v. Crown Life Insurance Co. provides the Supreme Court with the
opportunity to settle this issue.
ARGUMENTS
For Crown Life Insurance Company and Clarke Burton
Lloyd (Counsel of Record, Robert L. Frantz, 57th Floor, 600
Grant Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15219; telephone (412) 5628800)
1. The state statute of limitations most analogous to a
claim for injury to business or property should be
applied to all civil RICO claims and in Pennsylvania
the period is two years.
2. RICO does not provide a civil remedy for a person
allegedly injured by a predicate act when as that
427
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person admits, there was no pattern of racketeering
activity and there was no conspiracy in existence at
the time of injury.
3. If Malley-Duff has a RICO cause of action for its
termination injury, the statute of limitations began to
run on the date of injury.
4. Even if this Court should hold that the statute of
limitations did not start to run until Malley-Duff had
knowledge or should have had knowledge of a second
predicate act that it believed formed a pattern of
racketeering activity, its claim is barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.
ForAgency Holding Corp. (Illinois),Agency Holding Corp.
(Ohio), Kerry Patrick Craig,Diane Pariano,Erhman Ra.
tini Oglevee & Craig,Inc. and Robert Oglevee (Counsel of
Record, John H. Bingler, Jr., One Riveyfront Center,
Pittsburgh, PA 15222; telephone (.112) 39.1-7785)
1. Civil RICO provides enhanced civil remedies against
persons, who, in the course of acquiring or maintaining an interest in or conducting an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity, injure another directly or indirectly by one or more of the
racketeering activities forming the pattern. The essence of civil RICO is that it provides its civil remedies
only for injuries to business or property and only for
injuries caused by a wide variety of specified "predicate" state and federal crimes.
2. The two-year Pennsylvania statute of limitations governing actions for injuring property should be applied to the civil RICO claim here based on the
termination of the insurance agency contract. This is
so in this case regardless of whether a uniform or a
particular approach is used in choosing the applicable
statute of limitations.
3. A civil RICO cause of action accrues under sections

1962(a)-(c) when a plaintiff has been injured by a
predicate act which was committed in the course of a
violation of one of these sections. A RICO conspiracy
cause of action accrues when a plaintiff is injured by
an overt act of defendants engaged in a RICO conspiracy.
For Malley-Duff & Associates (Counsel of Record, Hatrn
Woodruff Turner, 1500 Oliver Building, Pittsburgh, PA
15222; telephone (412) 355-6500)
1. Malley-Duffl's claim is not barred because the statute
of limitations for all civil RICO claims should be the
statute of limitations applicable to the most analogous
federal statute.
2. Alternatively, Malley-Duff's claim is not barred because, as held by the court of appeals below, RICO
actions in Pennsylvania should be uniformly governed by Pennsylvania's six-year residuary statute of
limitations.
3. Alternatively, Malley-Duff's claims are timely under
the predicate act approach because the statute of
limitations for common law fraud is six years.
4. Regardless of which statute of limitations applies,
Malley-Duff's claim is not barred.

AMICUS BRIEFS

In Support of Crown Life Insurance Company, Agency
Holding Corp.
Congress Financial Corporation and Philadelphia
National Bank
In Support of Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc.
A. J. Cunningham Packing Corp., Chicago Dressed
Beef Co., Inc., Continental Food Products, Inc., Florence Beef Company and Pierce Trading Company

428

PREVIEW

HeinOnline -- 1986-1987 Preview U.S. Sup. Ct. Cas. 428 1986-1987

